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AbstrAct
This historical and comparative study attends to the phenomenon of collective resignation by 
registered nurses in the Swedish health services, with the aim of exploring the existence and  
utilization of shop floor power. The study uses two kinds of data: incidences of collective resignation 
since the 1980s are explored using newspaper data; second, two cases of collective resignation 
are comparatively explored using interview data. First is analyzed how contemporary opportunities 
to take this form of worker action arose. Then is analyzed how differences between the two cases 
shed further light on opportunity structures in different contexts of nursing, and on nurses’ ability to 
organize the resignation threat as a collective act. The study clarifies the existence of nurses’ shop 
floor power as it relates to opportunity structures, while also pointing to the significance of the 
extent of collectivism when nurses challenge employers by threatening this kind of industrial action.
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In a seminal exploration of global and historical trajectories of labor unrest, Beverly Sil-ver (2003: 123) observed that conflict has been on a long-term rise in service industries, which can be contrasted to the prolonged decline in strike activity in manufacturing in 
advanced economies (cf. Bordogna & Cella, 2002; Gall, 2013, 2015). The effects of this 
growing significance of services were difficult to assess, according to Silver, because of the 
heterogeneity of services. Certain service workers, in aviation for instance, will be able to 
seriously disrupt interdependent and international business activities through traditional 
strikes. However, major service industries like education and health care generally do not 
produce commodities and such workers therefore have little ‘structural’ or workplace 
bargaining power. On the other hand, Silver noted, they may compensate for this using 
‘associational’ forms of power (in the guise of strong union organizations and broad, 
cross-class alliances). However, in the context of contemporary conflicts in Swedish health 
care (Granberg, 2016), these instructive remarks, which probably reflect the opinion of 
many labor scholars, do not apply.
Because, in what is nowadays clearly the predominant form of labor conflict in Swed-
ish health services – registered nurses’ ‘collective resignations’ – workers make little use 
of associational forms of power. Indeed, this local and informal mode of conflict usually 
1 You can find this text and its DOI at https://tidsskrift.dk/njwls/index.
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does not extend beyond the individual workplace; it does not usually seek to mobilize the 
general public, nor does it rely on resources provided by the nurses’ union [unions are not 
legally permitted to support workers taking this kind of action (Bengtsson, 2006)]. As this 
analysis will illustrate, the collective resignation, as a form of labor conflict, emerges in 
the context of health care restructuring (Hood, 1995; Rankin & Campbell, 2009) along 
what might be called ‘neoliberal’ lines. Importantly, these restructuring processes involve 
the introduction of purchaser-provider schemes and inter- and intra-organizational mon-
etary transfers related health care specialization (in addition to outright privatization). In 
so many words, this constitutes a more or less thorough process of commodification, as 
against the de-commodification associated with the ascent of the welfare state. In the con-
text of Swedish industrial relations, this commodification expands nurses structural, or 
‘shop floor’ power, in that nurses become capable of inflicting financial losses on employ-
ers if they withdraw their labor power. However, as this article suggests, this shop floor 
power remains latent unless nurses collectivize the threat to resign.
The aim of the present study is to analyze the existence and utilization of shop floor 
power in nurses’ collective resignations. What are the sources of nurses’ structural, or 
shop floor, power? Moreover, how do nurses utilize these sources through collective 
action? The first finding emerging from this analysis is that certain groups of registered 
nurses have considerable shop floor power, due to commodification, labor scarcity, and 
bargaining devolution. Second, comparative case analysis shows important differences 
in nurses’ strategies when utilizing these sources of power in collective action, making 
for quite different outcomes. Data used in this article consist of two case studies and 
a study of newspaper reports (Granberg, 2016). The theoretical concepts used in the 
analyses are those of ‘opportunity structure’ and ‘collectivism’.
By way of introduction, the collective resignation is not a despondent act. In collec-
tive resignations, nurses vow to resign, but they do not generally intend to quit their jobs. 
Like the calling of a strike, this puts pressure on employers to accede to the demands 
nurses forward together with the threat to resign. Certainly, nurses risk losing their jobs 
and might have to find work elsewhere; the collective resignation is a kind of brinksman-
ship that certain workers who are in high demand and hard to replace are particularly 
well positioned to play. The nature and context of collective resignations will be further 
explained in the next section. Then follows a discussion of scholarship on recent patterns 
of labor conflict in advanced economies, and a discussion of the concepts of opportunity 
structure and collectivism in the context of analyzing labor conflict; this makes up the 
third section. The fourth section deals with matters of method. The fifth section presents 
the analysis and, lastly, the conclusion summarizes the results and considers them in light 
of the analytical aim and research questions set out in this Background section.
context: collective resignations and health care restructuring
There is no pinpointing the exact time and place when collective resignations emerge as 
a mode of collective action. In fact, at the time of the inception of labor movement activ-
ity in Sweden, it would seem difficult to separate this mode of action from proper strikes. 
Absenteeism, deliberate obtuseness, and mass resignations – referred to as ‘strikes’ or 
‘stoppages’ by Karlbom (1967: 30-1, 130-1, 152, 200) though hardly reminiscent of 
today’s procedural calling of strikes by recognized union organizations – spiked in late 
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18th and mid-19th century Sweden. While some of these actions involved work stop-
pages and worker representatives negotiating with management, in some cases, workers 
collectively resigned, sometimes after having secured alternative employment elsewhere, 
with the intention of reneging on this should employers grant sufficient concessions 
(ibid: 247). Hence, it is clear that ‘mass resignations’ were part of a repertoire of collec-
tive action involving a multiplicity of tactics. Later on, in the early 20th century, unions 
used it against employers who refused to bargain collectively, a strategy outlawed with 
the institutionalization of industrial conflict in the thirties (Bengtsson, 2006). As we shall 
see, this led to the collective resignation’s reappearance in informal guise.
There is little reason to believe collective resignations were particularly prevalent in 
the early postwar decades, which saw relatively low levels of strike activity, in contrast 
to the turbulent interwar decades (cf. Korpi, 1978). In 1951, however, the nurses’ union, 
whose membership did not receive the right to strike until 1965, organized a nationwide 
campaign for collective resignation. The legality of the tactic was disputed, but it never 
had to be put into effect. The union won significant pay rises in an economy plagued by 
inflation (Bohm, 1961: 329ff.).
These early incidences of collective resignation appear dissimilar, however, from the 
current phase. There are two reasons for this: as against the mass resignations intertwined 
with strike movements in the 18th and 19th centuries, collective resignations now con-
centrate in the public sector; and as against the pioneering campaign by the nurses’ union 
in the fifties, today’s collective resignations are workplace-level events organized by the 
rank and file, independently of unions. The current phase began in earnest during the 
nineties, that is to say, in tandem with the restructuring of health care, and of welfare ser-
vices generally, along neoliberal lines. In the nineties, efforts to restructure Swedish health 
care were made, inspired by New Public Management (NPM) (cf. Hood, 1995). This 
involved financial reorganization through subcontracting and introduction of purchaser-
provider schemes, and took place in a context of economic crisis and fierce drives for cost 
reduction and productivity increases throughout the public sector (Larsson et al., 2012; 
Martinussen & Magnussen, 2009). Thus, besides downright privatization, an intraorga-
nizational process of commodification ensued, promoting the devolution, quantification, 
and transparentization of welfare services, including health care (Blomgren, 2007).
Objections may be raised against labelling this a process of ‘commodification’, 
because restructuring mostly left services publicly financed (except in cases of outright 
privatization). Neoliberal reform certainly has a long way to go before health care 
becomes a commodity sold on open markets. Nevertheless, in terms of the power rela-
tion between employers and employees, it is important to stress how reforms tended 
to introduce a situation similar to that in the private, commodity-producing sector. 
Importantly, lower-level management in organizational subunits were put in charge of 
handling ‘their’ local expenses, turning these units into ‘cost centres’ to use the business 
jargon. Moreover, purchaser-provider schemes in conjunction with health care special-
ization, and the inter-county monetary transfers it brings, meant some hospital revenue 
now derived from units servicing extra-county patients, rather than local taxes. It will 
be shown that this puts some health care workers in a position to hurt employers finan-
cially, should they withdraw their labor power. This provides these workers with poten-
tial shop floor or ‘structural’ power as set out in the beginning of the article.
Turning to the nursing profession, restructuring brought contradictory developments 
that not only increased registered nurses’ workload but also empowered them. The severe 
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crisis of the early nineties – and to a lesser extent the milder recessions of the late nine-
ties and in conjunction with the crash of 2008 – took its toll on health care employment 
(County Councils, 2002; SALAR, 2012). However, reductions overwhelmingly hit groups 
like assistant nurses, orderlies, and medical secretaries; health care in Sweden ‘profes-
sionalized’ as doctors and registered nurses increased relatively (Selberg, 2012: 115–119). 
In turn, registered nurses assumed some of the tasks of groups who bore the brunt of 
layoffs. Workload and perceived threats to nurses’ autonomy were behind the nursing 
union’s critical stance on NPM reform: having first welcomed the integration of nurses 
into lower-level management, the union swiftly changed its stance in the face of the scale 
of cutbacks (Blomgren, 2003). Around this time, a shortage of nurses, related to a decline 
in the status of public professionals like nurses and teachers during the nineties, began 
to make itself felt, and continues to do so today; with a further drain caused by superior 
working conditions in neighboring Norway. Further, while registered nurses still mostly 
work in the public sector, growth of employment agencies increased their mobility. Over-
all, due to such trends in the nineties and in the first decade of the 21th century, registered 
nurses on the one hand got scarce and thus strong in terms of labor market position, 
while on the other hand they were exposed to higher levels of speed up and stress (Sel-
berg, 2012; SWEA, 2014: 429-432). Against this backdrop, the workplace-level drama of 
conflict unfolds, culminating in the standoff of collective resignation.
The above provides a brief historical account of collective resignations and recent 
transformations in health care and nursing in Sweden, illustrating the immediate context 
of this mode of worker action. In a European and Nordic perspective, three features of 
public sector industrial relations in Sweden should be noted, which help explain the 
emergence of collective resignations. These are the decentralization of wage bargaining, 
the relatively restrictive regulation of strikes, and the promotion of specialization and 
regional divisions of labor in health care.
Compared with other EU countries, Nordic public sector industrial relations were 
moderately impacted by recent economic crises, in terms of reductions in job lev-
els and changes to public sector employment regulation systems (Bordogna & Bach, 
2016; Wesley Hansen & Mailand, 2013). Instead, creeping changes starting with NPM 
reforms in the late eighties gradually altered the face of the public sector in Nordic 
countries, shifting the balance of power toward employers, away from unions (Jør-
gensen & Schulze, 2011; Wesley Hansen & Mailand, 2013). The scale of reform has 
varied across Nordic countries, however. Looking at public sector collective bargain-
ing, Sweden stands out in having implemented a system where top-level bargaining 
has to a large extent been replaced by forms of local bargaining (this applies especially 
to registered nurses whose union has pioneered this trend) (Thörnqvist, 2007; Wesley 
Hansen & Seip, 2017). Master agreements are still decided nationally, however. This 
fact, together with the peace obligation in the collective bargaining law, leaves Swed-
ish nurses in a peculiar situation where wages are largely decided locally, whereas 
the right to take collective action is restricted to the national level. In addition, while 
membership ballots play an important role in public sector bargaining in a country 
like Denmark (Scheuer et al., 2016), such ballots were removed in Sweden as unions 
centralized in the early postwar decades. Lastly, in terms of commodification of public 
services, it should be noted that health care in Sweden, as in other Nordic countries, 
has seen increased regionalization and specialization and thus increased monetization 
of services (cf. Vrangbæk, 2009).
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theory: opportunity and collectivism
The coincidence of ’labor quiescence’, that is, the marked decline in strike activity since 
the eighties, and the revival of popular contestation in connection with the last economic 
crisis, including in specific kinds of strike activity (Chirino, 2016: 384), appears to have 
precipitated an increased concern with the forms of worker action (cf. Gall, 2015; Kelly, 
2015: 729). Furthermore, to the extent that popular fightbacks against crisis-related 
austerity policies have included strikes, labor scholars have turned their attention to an 
increase in the incidence of general or ‘mass’ strikes in the advanced economies, mostly 
carried out by public workers (Kelly et al., 2013). Thus, the workplace-based strike of 
the seventies, carried out by workers in manufacturing and the extractive industries, 
would appear to have been superseded by large, highly profiled, and primarily sym-
bolic, protest strikes by public employees. What is lacking from this picture, painted by 
contemporary labor scholarship, is any measure of local action on the part of public 
workers. Indeed, although prone to support union-led mass strikes, the public workers 
of today would appear to lack the kind of workplace-level activism that characterized 
labor militancy in the seventies. This would also seem to apply to Nordic scholarship on 
recent episodes of industrial action. For example, scholars have analyzed large, union-
led strikes with a view to their outcomes (Scheuer et al., 2016), and the union-led resig-
nation campaign by Finnish union TEHY in 2007, which mobilized some 12,000 nurses 
(Henttonen et al., 20 13). Therefore, labor scholarship on new workplace-based forms 
of action is likely to enrich our understanding of contemporary conflict.
The collective resignation as carried out by registered nurses in Sweden is a new 
form of local labor militancy. In contrast to the union-led strike, it is an emergent and 
increasingly prevalent form of action in this country. I contend that it reflects the exis-
tence and utilization of ‘shop floor power’. It reflects the existence of shop floor power 
in the sense that transformations in the organization of health care and the institutional 
arrangements of public sector industrial relations have empowered nurses by creating 
the opportunity to threaten resignation as an effective means to improve their lot. Fur-
thermore, it reflects the utilization of such power in so far as nurses are able to exploit 
the existence of this opportunity by making the threat to resign a collective act; other-
wise, resignation would be a mere act of despondency or at best an individualist career 
strategy. Thus, the manifestation of shop floor power requires both the existence of the 
opportunity of threatening resignation as an effective lever and the collectivization of 
such threats. For these reasons, in order to explore the rudiments of shop floor power 
as manifested in nurses’ collective resignations, I draw on the concepts of ‘opportunity 
structure’ and ‘collectivism’.
‘Opportunity structure’ refers to the features of a power relationship and its wider 
context that enable and facilitate the taking of collective action as well as increase its 
efficacy in achieving desired outcomes (Kelly, 1998: 25, 27, 37, 100). For example, 
in the heydays of labor militancy in manufacturing during the seventies, interrelated 
production processes empowered blue-collar workers who did not hesitate to use sur-
prise tactics: this was the very foundation of their ‘structural’ power (Silver, 2003). This 
opportunity relates to the organization of labor processes and the nature of products, 
but another important opportunity structure is the industrial relations system and laws 
regulating collective action. The concept of opportunity structure thus abstracts from 
subjective processes, such as interest articulation and the practices and strategies of 
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organizing, to foreground the given, structural, features preexisting mobilization for 
collective action. However, just these processes are central when analyzing ‘collectivism’ 
(Kelly, 1998: 39ff.) In particular, the present study attends to how episodes of collective 
resignation display different organizational patterns and strategies. The latter are con-
ceived as key determinants of whether nurses are able to collectivize the threat to resign. 
Considering that collective resignation is based on the legal right of individual workers 
to quit their jobs – and considering the individualizing features of the neoliberal milieu 
where this mode of action thrives (e.g., individual wage setting) – it should be empha-
sized that workers can be organized on collective as well as individual grounds. That is, 
activists may call on workers to take action as individuals or as collectivities, reflecting 
how group interests are articulated in worker struggles (ibid: 6-9). The question of col-
lectivism thus relates to the concept of ‘organization’. In Tilly’s (1978) original formula-
tion, the concept spans both embryonic modes of organization embodied in the labor 
process and formal and informal, union and nonunion, local and extra-local, modes of 
organizing proper. In terms of the collective resignation, which is an informal mode of 
action that implies ad hoc organizational forms, a key question of organization is on 
what basis the decision to threaten the employer with resignation is taken. Is it taken 
individually or is it somehow collectivized?
In the analysis, I first explore processes relating to opportunity structures. Time-
series data will be used to explore which groups of nurses take collective resignation and 
how bargaining institutions condition their actions. Interview data and case comparison 
is used here to gauge the impact of commodification, which is difficult to assess on 
the aggregate level. Together, this will provide an assessment of opportunity structures 
making collective resignation feasible for nurses. Subsequently, interview data and case 
comparison is used to analyze organizational patterns and strategies.
Methods: time series and case study analysis
Collective resignation is not an officially recognized form of labor conflict and the Swed-
ish National Mediation Office does not collect data on it, as it does for illegal (wildcat) 
strikes. Moreover, collective resignations are not illegal unless conducted by a union 
organization, in which case it would most likely be ruled as an illegal blockade (cf. 
Bengtsson, 2006) and so become a matter of public record. Hence, the informal, though 
legal, nature of collective resignation makes it difficult to assess its incidence. While 
official strike data are not completely reliable, and have been deemed to underrate the 
extent of conflict (Thörnqvist, 1994: 91), the incidence of collective resignation has not 
been researched at all.
Official work on strike statistics, as well as influential studies in the field (e.g. Silver, 
2003), have searched newspaper reports to construct time series of different forms of 
collective action. Nowadays, this is even more feasible due to advances in newspaper 
digitization. Using the Digital News Archive (Mediearkivet), two searches were per-
formed whose results are used in the present study. The searches targeted 1) collective 
resignation in general and 2) collective resignations among registered nurses. The first 
search was meant to provide a preliminary indication of which categories of workers 
have used collective resignation. The second, more detailed, search was intended to cre-
ate a time series that would allow for an analysis of the incidence of nurses’ collective 
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resignations. The first search involved reading reports with the word ‘mass resignation’ 
(massuppsägning) in the headline and/or opening paragraph. The word ‘mass resigna-
tion’, rather than ‘collective resignation’, was used because it is a term favored by news-
papers. The second search included a wider set of terms in order to detect as many 
events as possible and spanned the entirety of article texts: ‘nurses’ (sjuksköterskor) was 
combined with ‘mass resignation’ or ‘protest’ (protest) or ‘revolt’ (uppror) or ‘resigning’ 
(säga upp sig). Protest was used because of its generic quality (it is used to describe very 
different kinds of contentious behavior). Uppror has been used in several recent grass-
roots political campaigns, including nurses, midwifes, and student nurses. Lastly, säga 
upp sig is a common rephrasing of uppsägning. Thus, every newspaper report contain-
ing ‘nurses’ and at least one of the four latter (truncated) terms, anywhere in the article, 
were captured in this search.
The first search detected 29 episodes of collective resignation carried out by dif-
ferent categories of workers, whereas the second detected 100 episodes of collective 
resignation carried out by registered nurses. To be sure, this material will underestimate 
the real incidence of collective resignation (the first search manifestly does, as it failed to 
detect most episodes detected by the second). However, regarding the first search, results 
are only used to show that while registered nurses are especially prone to take collec-
tive resignation, the phenomenon is not confined to this worker category. Thus, the first 
search can illustrate that several groups of public workers use this mode of action. Fur-
thermore, because the latter search yields data that should allow for an analysis of inci-
dence over time, there is an obvious problem: in the years searchable in Mediearkivet, 
from the early eighties up to the present, the number of digitized newspapers increase. 
A rising incidence might then reflect advances in newspaper digitization, rather than a 
real proliferation of collective resignations. In order to remove such distortions, a second 
time series was created, drawing on a constant set of newspapers.1 This second series 
is presented along with the first, full archive, series in the analysis below. Despite these 
precautions, however, results based on these small data sets must be taken as tentative 
rather than conclusive.
As explained in the previous section, time series analysis will be supplemented with 
comparative case analysis in order to explore opportunity structures more comprehen-
sively. For instance, newspaper data allow for an analysis of the outcomes of worker 
action, thus pointing to facts relevant to opportunity structures in the areas of contem-
porary nursing where collective resignation occurs. These findings are complemented by 
case study comparisons. Case studies are complementary because while aggregate level 
analysis allows us to gauge effects of labor scarcity and changes in bargaining institu-
tions, for example, it is not used here to assess effects of commodification, as it is difficult 
to determine whether the workplaces where collective resignations occur charge other 
health providers for their services (as well as the scale and significance of this revenue 
stream). However, making such an assessment is possible using more detailed case stud-
ies. Further, in the previous section, I stated that shop floor power is only partly about 
its existence as a potential, that is, as an opportunity workers have; its manifestation 
requires the collectivization of threats to resign. Whereas the first aspect of shop floor 
power can partly be analyzed at the aggregate level, the second aspect requires compari-
sons of cases displaying different degrees of collectivism.
Hence, two cases of collective resignation are compared with regard to opportu-
nity structures and collectivism. This is a theoretically informed analysis of information 
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given in interviews with ‘activist’ nurses (informants who described themselves as trying 
to mobilize the wider collectivity behind the threat to resign), which focuses on facts and 
events related by informants that are relevant to the two concepts considered here to 
make up the rudiments of shop floor power. Interviews are thus used as primary sources 
on how conflict transpired and on some of its determinants. In all, 17 interviews were 
held, but for the purpose of this study, analysis is restricted to interviews with activist 
nurses. In contrast to other interviews, which may be analyzed to elucidate different 
dynamics involved in labor conflict (e.g., ideology, cf. Granberg, 2015), activist inter-
views contain extensive reflection on the course and efficacy of collective action. Activist 
nurses are thus taken as expert witnesses, favorably positioned to describe conflict and 
its immediate determinants. Furthermore, while the first case study employed narrative 
interviewing and involved a larger set of informants (n = 12), the second case study was 
restricted to nurses who were assumed to speak in a capacity of activists (n = 5). How-
ever, to illustrate the results of the analysis, it will not be necessary to draw on all activist 
interviews: two or three per case will suffice. Quotes and block quotes are intended to 
illustrate findings and, more specifically, are used when informants describe events or 
facts relevant to opportunity structures and collectivism.
Episodes were sampled for the purposes of constructing and testing theory (cf. 
Emmel, 2013). That is, the second case was designed to facilitate a comparative evalua-
tion of the hypotheses that opportunity structures and collectivism are key determinants 
of collective resignations. Hence, it was important that cases differed in their outcomes, 
as well as regarding opportunity structures and degrees of collectivism. The first episode 
was something of a half measure: only one-third of the nurses employed at the facility 
chose to hand in their resignations, and their action only resulted in moderate improve-
ments that fell short of what nurses had demanded. The second case, in contrast, saw the 
collective resignation come to fruition: almost all registered nurses at the facility vowed 
to resign and their demands were fully met. I will provide a more detailed description 
of the how two cases differed below, but first I will note some similarities. The episodes 
occurred within 2 years of each other, and within the period 2011-2016 (l will not be 
specific for reasons of anonymity), and both took place at intensive care wards of major 
hospitals. Both conflicts, according to activists, took place against a background of cut-
backs, speed up, stress, and incursions by management on what nurses’ saw as their 
professional autonomy.
I will call Case I the less successful case of collective resignation (where only one-third 
of the registered nurses threatened to resign and demands were not fully met); and Case 
II the more successful collective resignation (where nearly all registered nurses threatened 
to resign and demands were fully met). Case I saw nurses demand a large pay raise (4000 
kronor; considerably more than usually afforded in ordinary rounds of local wage set-
ting). This demand was complex in the sense that activists considered it not just an end in 
itself that the group should be better paid but also as a means to facilitate recruitment to 
the ward, which they described as chronically understaffed. The nurses’ demands in Case 
II were in a sense more straightforward. They sought to prevent a reduction in wages by 
preserving a local contract about to be scraped as the hospital introduced a new frame-
work for wage setting, although activists of Case II also recognized such a reduction 
would mean problems of staffing, and thus more speed up and stress. Hence, while both 
cases exhibit wage-related demands that were expressly related to working conditions 
more generally, Case I was a proactive and Case II a defensive action. 
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Furthermore, the cases illustrate different histories and traditions of struggle. Nurses 
in Case I did not have prior experience in taking collective resignation. According to 
activists, there had been times when discontent spiked, when management reorganized 
the ward or failed to grant satisfactory wage raises (that would reflect the nurses level of 
experience, training, and education), but no collective action resulted. In contrast, nurses 
in Case II had taken collective resignation a decade earlier in order to stave off a similar 
move by management to scrap the local contract. In addition, nurses in Case II worked 
at a specialized and more commodified intensive care facility; more commodified in the 
sense that they mostly treated patients from other counties, treatments which thus gener-
ated income for the employer. Nurses in Case I did treat extra-county patients, but not 
to the extent that nurses in Case II did, because while the intensive care ward in Case II 
had a national obligation to provide treatment, the ward in Case I only had a regional 
obligation to do so. The contrast reflects different degrees of specialization within the 
overall framework of Swedish health services.
Analysis: incidence and cases of collective resignation
The four subsections that follow reflect a two-step analysis. The first two subsections 
deal with matters related to opportunity structures. The first subsection thus attends to 
incidences of collective resignation and in particular to how changes in public sector col-
lective bargaining and wage setting gave registered nurses institutional opportunities to 
take this kind of collective action. This analysis is based on data from searches in news-
paper archives. Some inferences are made here, which are further interrogated in the 
subsequent subsection dealing with the results of the comparative case study analysis. 
This subsection is based on case comparisons that attend to the sources of worker power 
and how these sources were varyingly present in the two cases. It extends the analysis 
of opportunity structures by pointing to the importance of commodification. While the 
first couple of subsections deal with the existence of shop floor power as a potential, the 
last two subsections are concerned with the utilization of this potential and accordingly 
focuses on the extent to which nurses in the two cases were able to collectivize the threat 
to resign. The third subsection thus attends to differences pertaining to organizational 
patterns in the two episodes of collective resignation, while the fourth inspects the orga-
nizational strategies that these patterns reflect.
oppo s I: labor scarcity and bargaining devolution
Who carries out collective resignations? It seems it is mostly public employees. The 
search on ‘mass resignation’ detected one collective resignation carried out by workers 
in the private sector (forestry). Police officers, firefighters, medical doctors, and social 
workers figure among the occupational groups that apply this strategy, but it seems this 
collective action mainly takes place in health services, and publicly employed registered 
nurses collectively resign more frequently than any other group.
From the second search, on registered nurses, it is clear theirs are workplace-based 
actions. In an average case of collective resignation, 17 registered nurses vow to resign. 
This reflects that mobilization is rarely total: threats to resign are usually made by 
118 Shop Floor Power Magnus Granberg
a majority, though not all, of the nurses at a workplace. About 70% of the actions 
occurred in fields that require specialist education (e.g., district nursing, anaesthetics, 
and intensive care). Specialist nurses are also more likely to succeed when taking col-
lective resignation. It was possible to establish an outcome in 68 of the 100 reported 
collective resignations by registered nurses; in some 44% of these, nurses chose to take 
back their resignations after having secured concessions from employers. Overwhelm-
ingly, these ‘successful’ collective actions were carried out by specialists, with nurses in 
intensive, surgical, and emergency care making up the vast majority.
Thus, it is mainly a scare group of public workers in Sweden, registered nurses, who 
carries out collective resignations and, particularly, specialist registered nurses. This sug-
gests these groups enjoy opportunity structures making collective resignation relatively 
feasible. Partly, this reflects the scarcity of their labor power. However, the rest of this 
subsection and the ensuing one suggests this is not the whole story.
Looking at the time-series of collective resignation by registered nurses in Chart 1, 
it is clear that this collective action has become increasingly prevalent. This conclusion 
also holds when considering the second time-series, using a constant set of newspapers. 
The latter diverges from the full-archive series toward the end of the period, probably 
because digitization advanced rapidly. Nevertheless, it displays the same rising trend, 
and short-term fluctuations in the two series are obviously correlated.
A trademark of informal labor conflict in Sweden is that it has tended to supplement 
the formal system of collective bargaining, in the sense that spikes in local wildcats have 
followed centralized negotiations and the signing of contracts at the national level. This 
pattern was especially clear in the seventies and eighties (Thörnqvist, 1994: 140). To 
see whether collective resignations reflect opportunity structures that the institutional 
framework of collective bargaining in the public sector provides, we should accordingly 
relate it to bargaining rounds and to changes in the bargaining system.
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There is a link between rounds of central collective bargaining by the nurses’ union 
and brief spikes in collective resignation, intersecting a secular trend where collective 
resignations increase with devolution of bargaining. For example, the first collective res-
ignations coincided with the wage negotiations and the strike of 1986. The eighties saw 
a gradual shift from centralized bargaining to local and individual forms of bargaining 
(before, nurses only received differential pay based on age). Hence, central level bargain-
ing became less important as a determinant of wages. The first real spike in collective 
resignations, in 1989, followed on the central negotiations in 1988 and a general move 
toward decentralization whereby local bargaining became more important in setting 
wages for white-collar county workers. The head of the nurses’ union stated that col-
lective resignations helped the union secure satisfactory local settlements (TT, 18/1-89). 
Economic crisis in the nineties interrupted the trend toward bargaining devolution as the 
state intervened in the negotiations of 1991-1993; this would also appear to have damp-
ened collective resignations. A new, though modest, spike took pace during the build-up 
to the strike of 1995. Grassroot campaigns and local vows to resign en masse pressured 
the union to bargain hard and launch the strike. The resultant contract increased bar-
gaining devolution and is described as a breakthrough for individual bargaining in nurs-
ing (cf. Calmfors & Richardson, 2004: 18–20).
The third spike, in the late nineties, similarly coincided with a bargaining round, 
which resulted in the contract of 2000. In contrast, however, this spike was more pro-
nounced, and registered nurses across the country were clearly aware, given the extensive 
media coverage, that their colleagues were taking action, making this spike resemble 
the waves of strikes ignited by high-profile wildcats, such as the strike wave following 
the miners’ strike of 1969-1970. The nurses’ union, rather than applaud militancy as it 
had in the past, condemned it as a potential breach of contract (Dagens Medicin, 27/4-99). 
Thus, while in the eighties the union seemed to encourage collective resignation, it 
dropped this permissive stance in the nineties. Significantly, while in the late eighties col-
lective resignations followed the close of central negotiations, in the nineties, local action 
preceded and thus pressured top-level bargaining.
In 2005, when the contract of 2000 expired, there was no renewed surge in collec-
tive resignations. However, the bargaining round still marked a watershed. A contract 
without fixed terms was signed, to be renewed annually, removing guaranteed minimum 
pay raises for individual nurses, which were now to be settled locally (though, impor-
tantly, centrally agreed general pay raises were retained). Discontent with the settlement 
grew among the rank and file and, in the build-up to the strike of 2008, there was a 
nationwide resignation campaign: thousands of nurses vowed to quit unless wages were 
substantially raised; and local negotiations triggered a spike in workplace-based col-
lective resignations. The contract of 2008 also meant a return to centrally guaranteed 
minimum wages, which, combined with additional raises secured in local negotiations, 
seem to have dampened collective resignations. As the 3-year contract expired, however, 
there was a new spike and this time more pronounced, a scenario that was repeated 
in the following bargaining round of 2013. However, the 2011 contract was the real 
watershed in that it dropped centrally agreed pay raises altogether, thus placing wage 
setting entirely in the hands of local parties. Predictably, this has been accompanied by 
high levels of local conflict in recent years.2
While developments in collective bargaining by themselves do not explain fluctua-
tions in the incidence of collective resignation – fiscal crises and changes in demand for 
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nurses’ labor power probably also affect the latter – the link between bargaining and 
collective resignation, shown above, is nevertheless a strong indication that collective 
resignation relates to institutional opportunities arising from the move to a more decen-
tralized bargaining system. As wage setting became a local issue, collective resignations 
increased. This suggests that collective resignation supplements the formal bargaining 
system and that it substitutes union-led strikes, much as the wildcats of the seventies did 
(Thörnqvist, 1994: 140).
opportunity structures II: commodification
Turning now to the two cases of collective resignation, another opportunity structure 
linked to this mode of action comes into view: commodification. However, all facts and 
events activist nurses considered significant in determining the outcome of conflict will 
be considered.
In the context of capitalist employment relationships (i.e., the sale and purchase 
of labor power as a commodity), there are two main sources of worker power. First, a 
particular form of labor power may be scarce, in part because what employers require is 
skilled, as in experienced and/or educated, labor. Second, the labor process will be more 
or less vulnerable to disruption and, relatedly, employers will be more or less financially 
vulnerable to disruption (but this presupposes that workers produce goods or services 
sold as commodities). Employer vulnerability translates into worker opportunity, and 
changes in this opportunity structure affect the power-balance between workers and 
employers (Kelly, 1998: 100).
Both cases saw a scare group of registered nurses threaten employers with a with-
drawal of labor power, in the form of handing in letters of resignation. Both groups also 
presented this ultimatum at a particular juncture, increasing the pressure put on employ-
ers: in connection with summer scheduling, a notoriously difficult process given the 
nursing shortage; employers regularly offer provisional bonuses to nurses who agree not 
to go on vacation during these months. Although in Case I, as against Case II, the inten-
sive care unit was not specialized, this did not make the nurses any easier to replace: 
they had to handle a greater variety of patients than nurses in Case II who worked in a 
particular field of intensive care. In this regard, both groups were probably equally hard 
to replace. Reflecting this strong labor market position, in both cases, several nurses 
applied for Norwegian licenses and secured new jobs as conflict progressed. 
However, looking at the financial vulnerability of employers, the cases differed in 
important ways. Both wards serviced extra-county patients, thus bringing in additional 
income to their counties. In Case I, the ward served a number of regional counties, 
and this allowed the group to put additional pressure on the employer according to an 
activist:
We serve this entire part of the country, and – of course – we’re aware of what that means. 
When we brought this up with the bosses, they we’re clearly concerned […] I mean we’re 
not so stupid not to have our own impact assessment of what it would mean if all of us 
left, in terms of the ward’s regional responsibility. It’s like they think we’re isolated at the 
ward, you know, us and our little patients [laughs], but we know how this world works 
(Case I)
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However, in Case I, activists did not emphasize the financial vulnerability so much as 
the political and moral hazards involved should the county fail to fulfil its regional obli-
gations. To be sure, the unit and the county stood to lose income, but activists did not 
stress this (pointing to other forms of financial risk, e.g., training new nurses and paying 
expensive agency staff). In Case II, in contrast, activists did emphasize the specific finan-
cial risk of income loss. The following accounts testify to this:
I’m really surprised they didn’t back down earlier. Because the surgery carried out here, 
which would have ground to a complete halt if we all had left, is a major source of income 
for the region. I mean, it’s not a negligible amount of money – it doesn’t just finance our 
department but a good part of the hospital as a whole (Case II)
The region has a national obligation to serve these patients, so it would’ve lost lots of 
money if it weren’t able to do this kind of work, if it went to others. So, there’s competi-
tion here, and that’s key to how things played out. They realized, ‘my god, we’re about to 
lose a real cash cow here!’ I think that was important, when they realized that (Case II)
It is clear from the above that Case II reflects a more advanced stage in the restructuring, 
specialization, and commodification of health care in Sweden. The county structure is 
replaced here by a larger region and the intensive care ward serves, not just neighbor-
ing counties, but a national market. The activists are aware that the income their labor 
creates is needed to run other parts of the regional health care system; in their view, this 
was key to the successful outcome of their collective action. The opportunity structure 
that consists in the financial vulnerability of employers, who receive a significant portion 
of income from specialized units providing care services paid by external organizations, 
thus appears as a determinant of the viability of collective resignation, and thus as a 
source of nurses’ shop floor power.
collectivism I: organizational patterns
Organization does not preexist collective resignation. Rather, organization is an emergent 
and mostly ephemeral feature of these collective actions, as it is in wildcat strikes in Sweden, 
which unions are also forbidden to organize (cf. Granberg, 2012). Therefore, when situa-
tions warrant that nurses take collective resignation, the problem of organization instantly 
presents itself. In light of debates on ‘individualism’ in contemporary advanced capitalism 
(Kelly, 1998: 64-65), the most salient problem in collective resignation, where the right to 
resign formally rests with the individual employee, is how individual and collective modes 
of decision-making are co-articulated. Case I and II differ markedly here.
First, however, a striking similarity in the description of the background to the two 
episodes of conflict should be stressed. In the early years of the new millennium, the 
newspaper searches detected many collective resignations prompted by the cancelation 
of agreements regulating staffing and scheduling on inconvenient hours, including pay 
supplements. Since these are local agreements, and since local unions are not allowed to 
take industrial action, canceling them is a relatively feasible way for management to cut 
labor costs. This happened in both our cases in the early 2000s, though while in Case 
I management was able to enforce a considerably less generous scheme, in Case II the 
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registered nurses threatened to resign and kept the original agreement. Nurses in Case I 
were thus, some 10 years later, fighting the effects of this alteration; staff had left and a 
reduced number of experienced nurses were under severe stress. On the other hand, in 
Case II, nurses were yet again faced with management trying to cancel the staffing and 
scheduling scheme they had successfully defended some ten years ago.
This background explains the fact that Case I was an essentially proactive move; in 
the subsequent section, it will be shown how nurses tried to enforce a significant pay rise 
in order to attract more staff to specialist training programs and to the intensive care 
ward. In contrast, Case II was a reactive action: yet again, nurses fought off an attempt 
to cut labor costs by canceling the agreement on inconvenient hours. The fact that the 
earlier struggle, waged by the nurses in Case II, was broadly similar to the situation they 
faced 10 years later meant they could draw on this experience.
In general terms, the modes of organizing for collective resignation in the two cases 
differ in the sense that Case I may be characterized as a coordination of individual acts, 
while Case II saw the collectivization of individual acts. Accordingly, in Case I, activ-
ists describe how they picked up on signals from colleagues that they were planning or 
contemplating to leave the ward, mainly because they did not want to put up with poor 
conditions anymore. Activists then informed management of this: ‘I thought if [manage-
ment] heard that so many were about to leave they would act quickly’ (Case I). How-
ever, management did not act on these warnings, and as time wore on activists received 
word from an increasing number of nurses that they would resign unless grievances 
were addressed. ‘We told them to hold on – “let’s bring this up with the bosses […] and 
give them a chance to act on this”’ (Case I). Thus, activists coordinated individual acts 
in order to win concessions, but they did not set up collective forms of decision-making.
In Case II, local negotiations were combined with meetings with all registered nurses 
at the ward. This provided a forum for joint discussion, and management’s insistence on 
scrapping the old scheme meant union representatives had to deliver a series of bad news 
that inflamed sentiments. Because this group of nurses knew they had been able to face 
down management before, there emerged a spontaneous call for collective resignation:
We had a meeting with a high turnout where we discussed this. ‘Where are we now, what has 
[management] offered, what are our key demands?’ Then many expressed how they couldn’t 
see any acceptable resolution. ‘I’m definitely willing to resign over this – is this an option for 
us?’ It developed quickly. Someone printed out forms and we started to sign. We put up a list 
on the bulletin board where we noted the resignations we had collected at the meeting. We 
figured that we needed at least fifty per cent to sign for it to be effective. (Case II)
In the days that followed more colleagues signed, and in the end, the vast majority did. 
Thus, activists in Case II did not merely coordinate individual acts; the above account 
illustrates that individual decisions to resign were anchored in collective forms of decision-
making. Case II illustrates a more collectivized – and more effective – mode of organization.
collectivism II: organizational strategies
While different organizational patterns reveal the morphology of collectivism, only by 
attending to activist strategy and how it affected these different organizational patterns 
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is the agency involved in collective action foregrounded. This is not a contingent factor 
that can be safely passed over in a study on the emergence of a form of worker action, 
such as the collective resignation. Rather, this agency is an expression of cultures of 
solidarity and struggle (Fantasia, 1988), which may have considerable longevity. The 
following comparisons show how differences in this regard affected collectivization.
In general, Case I and II display differences with regard to how activists worked to 
bring about group cohesion. These differences were linked to differences in organiza-
tional strategy. Activists in Case I did not attempt to recruit additional colleagues behind 
the threat to resign because they understood conflict action as something fundamentally 
individual: ‘everyone had to make up their own minds and we didn’t want to pressure 
them into anything’ (Case I). While activists in Case II respected that some nurses did 
not want to resign – indeed, they related how they had to stop some colleagues from 
castigating this minority – the previous section showed how they organized to make col-
leagues join collective action. Further, their collectivizing strategy facilitated the articula-
tion of collective interests (Kelly, 1998: 6–9), as will now be exemplified with reference 
to the use of ‘email lists’ in the two cases.
Because both groups worked shifts, placing coworkers in contact with each other 
was done through email communication, in addition to face-to-face meetings, which 
were not always easy to arrange. The email list is thus an important means of internal 
communication in contemporary collective resignations by registered nurses. Differences 
in how this means was used may be seen from the quotes below.
I was very busy with the email list […] People on vacation or parental leave had to be kept 
in the loop. And I tried to keep everyone up to date with how things progressed and to 
inform them about their rights (Case I)
The email list allowed us to discuss and decide on the issues that came up. ‘Should we 
accept this [offer] or should we keep going?’ And people got to have their say (Case II)
Whereas activists in Case I used the email list for one-way communication, activists in 
Case II used it to facilitate a continuous process of collective decision-making, thus pro-
viding a forum for the articulation and reaffirmation of a set of demands and, implicitly, 
a set of collective interests. Activist nurses in Case II referred to the latter as ‘keeping the 
group together’.
Efforts to keep the group together also guided a specific approach to the media. 
Activists in Case II stressed the dangers of a situation where different individuals 
made a range of unplanned statements. Instead, they insisted, only designated repre-
sentatives should make previously agreed upon statements. Otherwise, they reasoned, 
things would inevitably be said that did not reflect everybody’s opinion, which would 
undermine group cohesion. In contrast, activists in Case I considered talking to the 
press desirable in and of itself; as an exercise of public workers’ legal right of whistle-
blowing (meddelarfrihet), reflecting their overall outlook on conflict action as funda-
mentally individual. Thus, they encouraged coworkers to talk to the press: ‘I asked if 
anyone else wanted to say something […] I hoped that they would and that if they 
did others would feel emboldened to follow suit’ (Case I). The result was a series of 
articles in the local paper that had the effect of polarizing the nursing collectivity (cf. 
Granberg, 2014).
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This strategy was all the more detrimental given problems relating to interest 
articulation, hampering the mobilization drive in Case I. As explained above, Case I 
was basically a ‘proactive’ collective action in the sense that activists demanded a pay 
rise to combat the drain on experienced personal the ward had seen since the cancella-
tion of the local agreement on inconvenient hours in the early 2000s. This meant activ-
ists had to endure charges of greed and irresponsibility (Granberg, 2015). Moreover, 
to counteract the drain on personal, they had to enforce a local pay rise (above that 
afforded to other intensive care nurses in the vicinity). This affected interest articula-
tion: the localist nature of demands barred the use of some encompassing moral frames 
(cf. Kelly, 1998: 29) often applied in nurses’ collective actions (e.g., equal pay and 
gender equality). Instead, activists in Case 1 had to combine particularistic concerns 
with how work at their specific ward was remunerated with a more general frame that 
foregrounded how the quality of care would improve with higher pay and more staff. 
Getting this message across was difficult, and news reports with spontaneous state-
ments by individual nurses from the ward aggravated these problems. In contrast, in 
Case II, the unified and restrictive media strategy, together with the defensive maneuver 
of resisting a wage cut, was unproblematically combined with wider moral frames 
such as fighting austerity politics and defending the rights of patients to quality care 
services.
conclusion: the existence and utilization of shop floor power
The conclusions of this analysis are necessarily dual, given the aim to explore the exis-
tence and utilization of shop floor power. I argued that shop floor power is on the 
one hand a mere potential, a structural opportunity to exert power and force conces-
sions from management through collective action. On the other hand, shop floor power 
becomes manifest, in and through collective resignation, only when activists manage to 
collectivize the threat to resign.
In order to answer the question ‘What are the sources of nurses’ shop floor power?’ 
the present study undertook an analysis of opportunity structures. Data on incidences of 
collective resignation suggest these sources include labor scarcity: it is registered nurses 
in particularly short supply, the specialists, that are most prone to take collective res-
ignation and that are most likely to carry it out successfully. In addition, the incidence 
of collective resignation over time suggests this informal mode of action works to sup-
plement the formal bargaining system – spiking in bargaining years – and substitute 
union-led strikes. Time series analysis also suggests collective resignations become more 
frequent with devolution of bargaining: local bargaining presents certain groups of nurs-
ing specialists with the opportunity to take action to improve their lot. Moreover, case 
comparison suggests an additional reason, besides scarcity, why it is mostly specialist 
nurses who take, and succeed when taking, collective resignation. These nurses are often 
found in specialized hospital units, functioning as ‘cash cows’ of local health care sys-
tems by treating extra-county patients for money. Through commodification, efforts to 
restructure Swedish health care seem to have empowered nurses working in such units, 
enabling them to wield a ‘structural’ power that has mostly been confined to industrial 
workers. Importantly, as health care specialization advances, the economic significance 
of these workplaces grows, along with nurses’ shop-floor power.
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In order to answer the question ‘How do nurses utilize these sources of shop floor 
power?’ an analysis was undertaken of collectivism in the two cases of collective resig-
nation. Case comparison showed that the more successful case of collective resignation 
(Case II) displayed organizational patterns that involved a higher degree of collectiviza-
tion than the less successful case. The latter case involved the coordination of individual 
threats to resign, but activists did not seek to make this threat a product of collective 
decision-making, as in Case II. Moreover, different organizational patterns were found 
to reflect different organizational strategies. While activists in Case I tried to accom-
modate individual attitudes on whether or not to resign and urged individual nurses to 
voice their own grievances to managers and the press, activists in Case II consistently 
tried to ‘keep the group together’. That is, in addition to integrating the (by legal neces-
sity) individual decision to resign into collective forms of decision-making, activists in 
Case II worked to strengthen group cohesion through, for instance, strict media policy. 
In doing this, they seem to have benefitted from previous experiences in taking collec-
tive resignation and from the fact that their prior militancy meant they could wage the 
essentially defensive struggle of staving off employer efforts to reduce labor costs.
Looking at these findings from a Nordic perspective, three features of Swedish pub-
lic sector industrial relations and health care organization stand out. Arguably, the con-
coction of these features explain the salience of collective resignation in this country, as 
compared with other Nordic countries. In the first place, restrictive regulations on strike 
action have produced a tradition of informal action with considerable longevity. Second, 
together with relatively pronounced bargaining decentralization, this means wages in 
the public sector are increasingly set in a local context where workers do not have the 
right to strike. However, and this is the twist, such devolution places the battle over 
wages at the exact level where a rare existence of shop floor power in public services has 
evolved, as an effect of the third feature: health care specialization and commodification.
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endnotes
1   Because digitization makes a bit of a leap in the late nineties, the second time-series starts in 1995. It 
is based on nine papers, held constant throughout the period: one news agency (TT), four national 
newspapers (Aftonbladet, Dagens Nyheter, Expressen, Svenska Dagbladet), three local newspapers 
(Göteborgs-Posten, Helsingborgs Dagblad, Västerbottens-Kuriren), and one trade journal (Dagens 
Medicin)
2   For this account of recent developments in collective bargaining, I rely on newspaper reports, princi-
pally from Dagens Medicin and TT.
